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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JEREMY D.PENICK 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20110495-CA 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
Appeal from a conviction for one count of Attempted Murder, a First Degree 
Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2) (A) in the Third District Court, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Royal L Hansen, Judge, presiding. 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-102(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
I. Whether defense counsel ineffectively failed to file a motion to suppress evidence 
obtained as the result of an illegal arrest. 
a. Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Perry, 2009 UT 
App51,f9,204P.3d880. 
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b. Preservation of the Argument. Defense counsel did not raise defendant's 
motion, so this matter must be reviewed under ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
CONSTITUTIONAL OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
This appeal is governed by U.S. Const. Amend. IV, VI and XIV, Utah Const. Art. 
I §§ 7, 12, 14; Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On December 23, 2009, the State charged the defendant by information with one 
count of attempted murder and one count of aggravated robberry. R. 1-3. On February 
1-3, 2011, the case was tried to a jury and on February 3, 2011, the jury found the 
defendant guilty of both counts in the information. R. 163, 210-12. On February 14, 
2011, the defendant filed a motion to arrest judgment. R. 171-77. On April 29, 2011, 
the court granted defendant's motion to arrest judgment on the aggravated robbery, 
count two. R. 214. On April 29, 2011, the defendant was sentenced to a term of three 
years to life in the Utah State Prison. R. 198-99,214. On May 25, 2011, the defendant 
filed a notice of appeal. R. 200-01. On July 5, 2011, the Utah Supreme Court transferred 
the case to this Court. R. 209. 
2 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Prior to trial, Mr. Penick had indicated that he wanted to proceed pro se and was 
dissatisfied with appointed counsel. R. 23-32, 37-45, 52-55, 57-59. However, on the day 
of trial, Mr. Penick indicated to the court that he wanted the assistance of counsel. R. 
210:11-14. During voir dire, Mr. Penick indicated that he wanted a jury composed of 
people of his age group. R. 210:18. The trial court denied that motion. R. 210:19. 
1. Testimony of Joseph Magack. 
Joseph Magack was a taxi driver who worked for the Ute Cab Company. R. 
210:30. At around 9 pm on December 19, 2009, Mr. Magack was dispatched to a Motel 
6 to pick up some people. R. 210:32. When he arrived at the Motel, the defendant and 
another person were there. R. 210:34. One of the men, a white man, sat behind Magack 
while the defendant sat to his right. R. 210:36-37. When Magack asked where the men 
were going, they both gave different addresses. R. 210:37. Magack recognized one of the 
addresses, the Park Place Apartments, and said he would take them there. R. 210:37. 
As they were driving, Mr. Magack commented that there was a lot of fog that 
night, and one man responded that "yeah, this night is going to be crazy." R. 210:38. The 
whole drive took about three minutes. R. 210:38. When he arrived at the apartments, 
the men had him drive in, then they asked him to open the doors. R. 210:39-40. He 
opened the van's right sliding door, then the men "ordered" him to park in someone 
3 
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else's parking spot. R. 210:41. This area had other cars parked in it and was the typical 
parking for the apartment complex. R. 210:79. It was dark outside and the only light 
came from the dome light in the van that gave "a little light inside the car...." R. 210:66. 
The white man, Ramsay, said that the men wanted to get out. R. 210:45, 68. 
As soon as Mr. Magack put the car in park the defendant stabbed him in the right 
shoulder while the white guy held his neck. R. 210:46. He testified that both men had 
knives, but he did not know what kind, only that the weapons were shining. R. 210:69-
70. He was not able to describe how the defendant held the knife because "it happened 
so quickly." R. 210:72,73. In fact, Magack did not tell the police there were two knives; 
it was only after he "later concentrated" that he remembered two knives. R. 210:82. He 
testified that "[i]n the beginning I thought there was one knife but later I thought there 
was two knives because the one behind me had a knife." R. 210:83. The white guy used 
his left arm to hold Magack's neck and his right arm to punch him. R. 210:47. Jeremy 
also stabbed Magack twice in the side with a knife. R. 210:48, 59. The defendant's head 
was about 12-14 inches away from Magack's during the attack. R. 210:67. Magack was 
not sure if one of the men wore gloves because "everything happened so quickly." R. 
210:86. Magack tried to defend himself, but his seatbelt initially restrained him, he was 
able to push the men back and punch them. R. 210:48-49. He was able to get his seatbelt 
4 
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off and open the driver's door. R. 210:50. However, the white guy continued to hold his 
neck and the defendant grabbed his arm with both hands. R. 210:51. 
Magack was able to break free of the grip and exit the vehicle. R. 210:52. He 
estimated the attack took 15-20 seconds in which he was stabbed approximately nine 
times. R. 210:52. Mr. Magack was a fourth degree black belt and testified he used those 
techniques to defend himself. R. 210:53. As soon as he escaped the car, the men ran off 
together. R. 210:54, 56. The defendant did not try to help him, he testified. R. 210:57. 
Magack called the police and was taken to the hospital. R. 210:57. Magack 
testified that he only needed stitches on his face, ear, knuckle and side. R. 210:76. The 
men never tried to steal any money or the vehicle. R. 210:77. Magack initially told the 
police that one attacker was a black man and the other was a Hispanic man. R. 210:83. 
He admitted that he mistook the white man for a Hispanic, in part "because there was 
fog outside, [so he] couldn't see well who they were." R. 210:83. When the officers 
showed Mr. Magack single color photographs of the suspects, he "remembered" that one 
of the men was wearing grey. R. 210:84. As to the second suspect, Magack "thought he 
was Hispanic but when [the police officer] showed me the picture I saw the picture of a 
white person." R. 210:84. 
5 
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2. Testimony of Joseph Michael Ramsay, 
Mr. Ramsay refused to answer whether he had already pled guilty to attempted 
murder, saying that he did not "want to testify against this gentleman here." R. 211:9-10. 
He claimed he did not know the defendant, having "[n]ever seen him in my life." R 
211:9. He said he spoke with officers, but did not remember what he said since he was 
not taking medication at the time. R. 211:10. He refused to answer questions, saying it 
was a waste of his time. R. 211:11. 
3. Testimony of Joseph Magack. 
Mr. Magack retook the stand to say that Mr. Ramsay was the other person who 
attacked him. R. 211:13-14. Magack admitted he mistook Mr. Ramsay as a Hispanic 
male and that he originally told the police that this person wore a grey sweatshirt. R. 
211:14. 
4. Testimony of Derek Coats. 
Derek Coats, a detective with the Salt Lake City police department, testified that 
he followed up on the initial police investigation. R. 211:16-17. He obtained and viewed 
surveillance footage from the Motel 6 and observed a white and a black male that 
matched the description of the perpetrators. R. 211:17-18. He was told the suspects were 
a black male 5'7" to 5'9", wearing a blue jacket, grey pants and dark shoes with a white 
6 
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male over G tall wearing a yellow hoodie with a jacket over it and pants. R. 211:18. The 
officer took a still black and white shot from the video and showed it to the victim, who 
confirmed that these were the two men who attacked him. R. 211:18-19. Mr. Magack 
told the officer that both assailants wore grey sweatshirts. R. 211:55. 
The officer circulated the photos to the news media and subsequently received a 
tip that people involved might be at the VOA youth shelter. R. 211:20-22. At the VOA, 
the officer entered and immediately saw the defendant. R. 211:23. The defendant 
approached him and asked the officer what he was investigating and if he was there for 
donations. R. 211:24. Later, after talking with the VOA director, the officer returned 
and "took him into custody. I explained to him that he was being detained on suspicion 
of an aggravated assault and I wanted to talk to him about it." R. 211:26. Officer Coats 
transported Mr. Penick to an interview room at the police station. R. 211:26. 
The officer left a surveillance photo on the desk and when he returned, the 
defendant pointed to the photo and said that it was taken when he came from the 
shelter. R. 211:28-29. The defendant told the officer that he met "Josh" at the shelter, 
that the two of them called a taxi and that he and Josh then went separate ways. R. 
211:30-31. The officer met a person named Josh at the VOA, and while admitting the 
man also wore a yellow hoodie and "had a similar build and height as the individual the 
photograph," the officer "personally" felt he did not match. R. 211:31. 
7 
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Subsequently, the officer Mirandized the defendant, who finished the rights for 
the officer. R. 211:34. Mr. Penick indicated that he did not know the white man's name, 
other than his street name of "Rabbit," and that they called a taxi from the Motel 6. R. 
211:36-37. The officer determined that Joseph Ramsay's street name was Rabbit. R. 
211:37-38. The officer then left; the interview room and the defendant knocked on the 
door and motioned for the officer to sit down. R. 211:38. The defendant then told the 
officer that he got into the taxi van. R. 211:39. He said that they drove to an apartment 
complex and that suddenly the white guy attacked the driver. R. 211:40. Mr. Penick told 
the officer that he attempted to stop the white guy, but that it might have looked to the 
driver like he was attacking him. R. 211:40-41, 58. Mr. Penick said that he received no 
wounds but that the white male had injuries to his right forearm. R. 211:42. While 
officers were photographing the defendant, he indicated that he wanted to write a letter 
to the victim. R. 211:46-47. In the letter, Mr. Penick told Mr. Magack that "I wish I 
could have helped you more" and that "I was very stupid and I wish I was never there and 
you never got hurt." R. 211:48-49,76. In fact, Mr. Penick never admitted in the letter to 
committing the crime. R. 211:76. While the defendant waited, the video continued to 
record, and the defendant said that "he was going to go away for a long time for this and 
he was prepared." R. 211:50-51. He also said that "I'm glad the fool didn't die. I 
wouldn't want to go up for homicide," and said that "I guess I'm fucked." R. 211:51, 52. 
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He also requested that he call his girlfriend "to let her know that he was going to go away 
on this one, she wasn't going to see him for a long time." R. 211:52. However, Mr. 
Penick consistently told the officer that Mr. Ramsay was the attacker. R. 211:61. The 
officer also admitted that it was a "reasonable" conclusion that Mr. Penick did not 
confess to the crime, but only admitted he was "in a very dicey situation, having been 
present at the scene of this attack." R. 211:62-63. 
The officer subsequently located black gloves on Mr. Ramsay. R. 211:60. In 
viewing the Motel 6 surveillance footage, the officer admitted that the gloves Mr. 
Ramsay wore were consistent with the gloves the officer found on Ramsay. R. 211:75. 
He also claimed that Mr. Penick's pants were the same in both the video and when he 
arrested him. R. 211:74. 
After a recess, the State moved to admit Mr. Ramsay's hearsay statements to the 
officer. R. 211:66-71. The court allowed the statements for the limited purpose of 
impeaching Mr. Ramsay's statement that he "forgot" what he told the officer. Id. The 
State presented testimony that Mr. Ramsay did make statements to the police, and 
subsequently rested, reserving the right to call a physician out of order because of 
scheduling difficulties. R. 211:79-83. 
9 
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5. Defense Motion to Dismiss. 
After the State's partial rest, the defense "concede[d] that there's been probable 
cause ... on Count 1," however it contended that the State presented insufficient 
evidence to convict on the robbery count. R. 211:85. The State responded that "the fact 
that there was no demand obviously doesn't negate the fact" that the two tried to 
incapacitate Mr. Magack. R. 211:86. The court indicated that "I don't know that the 
record shows that any property was taken or any demand for property was taken." R. 
211:87. The State admitted "the evidence is totally circumstantial" but that intent to rob 
could be inferred from the circumstances. R. 211:88. 
The defense responded that it was possible the men only had the intent to injure 
Mr. Magack. R. 211:89. The court conceded that this was "a very close question" but 
denied the motion to dismiss. R. 211:89. 
6. Testimony of Jeremy Penick. 
Jeremy Penick had been homeless for a few years, using services at the Volunteers 
of America. R. 211:94-95. One day, Jeremy was talking with someone about getting a job 
harvesting medicinal marijuana in California when Mr. Ramsay approached him, asking 
if he needed money. R. 211:97. Ramsay asked him if had experience selling cocaine and if 
he'd like to sell some; Jeremy answered yes to both questions. R. 211:97. Jeremy told Mr. 
Ramsay that he would charge him $30 for every gram he sold. R. 211:98. Ramsay agreed 
10 
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and left, saying he would be back in several minutes. R. 211:99. Ramsay did not return 
and Jeremy went back to his work at the VOA. R. 211:99-100. 
The next day, Ramsay showed back up and Jeremy decided to "give him the 
benefit of the doubt" and continue the prior arrangement. R. 211:102-03. The two 
agreed to meet the next day and Ramsay would go get the drugs that he had. R. 211:103. 
On the third day, Ramsay showed up at the VOA around 11 am and the two left 
together in the afternoon after Jeremy did chores. R. 211:103. The two men went to the 
TRAX stop, Ramsay purchased a train ticket, and the two rode from there to a bus, 
eventually ending up in Orem. R. 211:104. Once in Orem, the two transferred to a 
different bus to go to Ramsay's campsite. R. 211:104-06. The men apparently missed the 
campsite and Jeremy decided they should head back to Salt Lake. R. 211:107-08. 
Once they arrived back in Salt Lake, Jeremy wanted to part ways, but Ramsay 
produced four, small ring-sized bags of methamphetamine. R. 211:108-11. Jeremy said 
he didn't have experience selling meth, but since he wanted Ramsay to pay him for the 
wasted trip he agreed to find a buyer for the meth. R. 211:112. Jeremy solicited 
interested persons in front of the shelter and took them to Ramsay. R. 211:113-14. 
Jeremy watched Ramsay and the clients get together, but Ramsay claimed that he did not 
sell drugs to the prospective buyers. R. 211:115. Jeremy did not see Ramsay use drugs, 
but he opined that Ramsay appeared high after getting together with the clients. R. 
11 
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211:115, 149-50. Ramsay said that he could get more meth and sell it if they went to the 
Park Place Apartments. R. 211:116-17. By this point, it was nine or ten in the evening. 
R. 211:117. 
The two decided to get a cab. R. 211:118. Ramsay still appeared to be under the 
influence of methamphetamine. R. 211:118. Jeremy assumed Ramsay would pay for the 
cab fare. R. 211:122. He also admitted that he was present in the Motel 6 surveillance 
video along with Mr. Ramsay. R. 211:123. Ramsay wore gloves. R. 211:124. 
The two men waited outside for the cab to arrive, and when it did, Ramsay 
entered first and sat behind the driver, while Jeremy sat on the back passenger side. R. 
211:124-25. Ramsay asked to go to the Park Place Apartments and Mr. Magack took 
them there to the front gate. R. 211:126-29. Jeremy asked Ramsay where the apartment 
was, then both men asked Mr. Magack to take them to the back. R. 211: 128-29. Mr. 
Magack kept pulling in and Ramsay told him to keep going toward the back. R. 211:129-
30. 
Mr. Magack parked the mini-van and as Jeremy opened the door and started to 
step out, he "noticed that Joseph Ramsay proceeded to attack Mr. Magack." R. 211:131. 
At first, Jeremy was confused, but as soon as he understood what was happening, he 
"proceeded trying to stop Ramsay from attacking Mr. Magack." R. 211:131-32. Jeremy 
grabbed Ramsay's hand, then arm, and pushed him back. R. 211:132. Jeremy succeeded 
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in pulling Ramsay off Mr. Magack and Jeremy went forward to see if he was alright, 
trying to unbuckle Mr. Magack's seat belt, but Mr. Magack "took a swing at me." R. 
211:132. After the attack, Jeremy stood outside the cab, clearing his head. R. 211:136. 
Ramsay asked Jeremy if he was going to turn him into the police. R. 211:137. Jeremy 
didn't answer and eventually fled, since this was a "serious crime and I didn't want to be 
accused of anything with regard to this." R. 211:137. 
Jeremy did not call the police or seek medical attention for Mr. Magack. R. 
211:155-Jeremy's girlfriend encouraged him to turn himself in, but he admitted he was 
scared of "being accused of [Ramsay's] crime." R. 211:159. Jeremy admitted to having 
prior convictions for false information and other misdemeanor conduct. R. 211:133-35. 
He also admitted to dealing drugs in the past. R. 211:139-40. However, Jeremy denied 
knowing of, or participating in the attack. R. 211:133. 
7. Rebuttal Testimony of Joseph Magack 
Mr. Magack said that at no point did Jeremy attempt to help him. R. 211:169, 
170. Mr. Magack said that he was not confused—that Jeremy "attacked me." R. 211:170. 
While Mr. Magack tried to exit the car, Jeremy held his hand trying to keep him from 
getting out of the car. R. 211:170-71. Jeremy also fled as soon as he got out of the car. R. 
211:171. 
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8. Testimony of Deanne Long 
Ms. Long was an emergency room physician at the University of Utah. R. 
211:174-75. She examined Mr. Magack and found potentially serious stab wounds to his 
neck and chest. R. 211:178. Both wounds could have been fatal. R. 211:179-80. 
However, when she saw Mr. Magack, he was not bleeding to death. R. 211:183. Mr. 
Magack only had sutures to repair injuries to the cheek, ear, and chest. R. 211:183-84. In 
fact, Dr. Long opined that Mr. Magack's injuries were not life threatening. R. 211:187. 
Nor would there be any major disfigurement but for a scar. R. 211:188-89. 
9. Defense Renewed Motion to Dismiss the Robbery and Subsequent 
Granting of the Motion to Arrest Judgment 
Defendant renewed a motion to dismiss the robbery count and the court 
admonished counsel to put the motion in writing. R. 212:10-11. At sentencing, and after 
having received motions from the parties, the trial court granted the motion to arrest 
judgment on Count 2, the Aggravated Robbery count of the information. R. 171-77; 
183-86; 206-207, 214:7. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defense counsel ineffectively failed to file a motion to suppress Mr. Penick's 
statements made as the result of an illegal arrest. The police officer lacked probable cause, 
at the time he arrested Mr. Penick, that Mr. Penick was the person who allegedly 
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committed these attacks. Because probable cause was lacking, defense counsel had an 
obligation to file a motion to suppress evidence and was ineffective for failing to do so. 
The victim's identification of the defendant was unreliable at best, and absent the 
defendant's admissions that he was present at the scene, the jury would not have been 
able to reasonably conclude that Mr. Penick was responsible. Additionally, defense 
counsel could have presented valuable evidence of the flaws in eyewitness identifications. 
Consequently, counsel's failure to file the motion would have resulted in the lack of 
defendant's statements, which would have led to a not guilty verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
At no point did defense counsel challenge defendant's arrest. This constituted a 
critical error that deprived Mr. Penick of a fair trial. 
L DEFENSE COUNSEL INEFFECTIVELY FAILED TO 
CHALLENGE THE OFFICER'S ARREST OF DEFENDANT 
At no point did defense counsel challenge Detective Coats' arrest of the 
defendant. Counsel's failure to file a motion to suppress, despite clear evidence that 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated, constitutes ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
15 
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To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that 
his counsel's "performance both falls below an objective standard of reasonableness and 
prejudices his client." Adams t>. State, 2005 U T 62, f 25,123 P.3d400 (citing Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687,104 S. Ct. 2052,80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant 
must show: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) a 
reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would 
have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. To satisfy the first part of the 
test, defendant must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel 
rendered adequate assistance. 
State v. Ott, 2010 U T 1, f 22, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel - Counsel's Performance Was 
Objectively Deficient 
Defense counsel's failure to move to suppress the evidence was objectively 
deficient. The United States Supreme Court has held that defense counsel's failure to file 
a motion to suppress evidence under the Fourth Amendment was constitutionally 
deficient and that the defendant was entitled to a hearing on whether counsel's failure 
prejudiced him, also setting the standard for litigating these claims: 
Where defense counsel's failure to litigate a Fourth Amendment claim 
competently is the principal allegation of ineffectiveness, the defendant must also 
prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a 
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reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent the 
excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice. 
Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,375,106 S. Ct. 2574, 2583,91 L. Ed. 2d 305 
(1986). 
1. The Fourth Amendment Claim is Meritorious - The Officer Lacked 
Probable Cause to Effectuate an Arrest 
Both the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution protect individuals from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const, 
amend. IV; Utah Const, art. I, § 14. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens' "basic" 
right to a free society and is the "very essence of liberty." See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 
U.S. 753,758, 105 S.Ct. 1611 (1985) ("The Fourth Amendment protects ... 'the right to 
be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized 
men."') (quoting Olmsteadv. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478,48 S.Ct. 564 (1928) 
(Brandeis, J., dissenting)); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528, 87 S.Ct. 1727 
(1967) ("The Fourth Amendment thus gives concrete expression to a right of the people 
which is 'basic to a free society.') (quoting Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27, 69 S.Ct. 
1359 (1949), overruled by,Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961)); Harris v. 
United States, 331 U.S. 145,150,67 S.Ct. 1098 (1947) ( "This Court has consistently 
asserted that the rights of privacy and personal security protected by the Fourth 
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Amendment... are to be regarded as of the very essence of constitutional liberty; and that 
the guaranty of them is as important and as imperative as are the guaranties of the other 
fundamental rights of the individual citizen ...") (quoting Gouledv. United States, 255 
U.S. 298,304,41 S.Ct. 261 (1921)). 
Defense counsel's failure to file a motion was objectively deficient, because the 
officer lacked probable cause to effectuate an arrest of the defendant. Mr. Penick's 
statements to the police, therefore, would have been suppressed had counsel filed the 
motion. 
The Fourth Amendment allows for three different kinds of police-citizen 
encounters, each permitting a different degree of intrusion and requiring a 
different level of justification. 
"(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time and pose questions so 
long as the citizen is not detained against his will; (2) an officer may seize a 
person if the officer has an articulable suspicion that the person has 
committed or is about to commit a crime ...; (3) an officer may arrest a 
suspect if the officer has probable cause to believe an offense had been 
committed or is being committed." 
State v. Worwood, 2007 U T 47, % 21, 164 P 3 d 397,405-06. Level two encounters are 
"brief and non-intrusive" detentions. State v. Hansen, 2002 U T 125, f 35, 63 P.3d 650, 
661. While a level three encounter "involves an arrest, which has been 'characterized [as 
a] highly intrusive or lengthy detention [that] requires probable cause.'" Id. at f 36 
(quoting United States v. JVerkingy9l5 F.2d 1404, 1407 (10th Cir. 1990)). 
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The defendant was not briefly detained. He was taken, against his will, to the 
police department, to an interview room, where he confessed to police his presence 
during the crime. R. 211:26-63. As such, the officer's arrest needed to be supported by 
probable cause. 
Both the United States and Utah Constitutions require probable cause to 
effectuate an arrest. State v. Trane, 2002 U T 97, f 26, 57 P.3d 1052,1059. Probable 
cause is defined as "facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are 
sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the 
circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to 
commit an offense." Id. at f 27, citing Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 35, 99 S.Ct. 
2627,61 L.Ed.2d 343 (1979); Gerstein v. Pugk 420 U.S. 103,111,95 S.Ct. 854,43 
L.Ed.2d 54 (1975); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89,91, 85 S.Ct. 223,13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964); 
Brinegarv. United States, 338 U.S. 160,175,69 S.Ct. 1302,93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949). 
Similarly, this court explained that in Utah the determination of whether the 
police had probable cause to arrest someone without a warrant " 'should be made 
on an objective standard: whether from the facts known to the officer, and the 
inferences [that can] fairly... be drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent 
person in [the officers] position would be justified in believing that the suspect 
had committed the offense.' " State v. Cole, 674 P.2d 119, 125 (Utah 1983) 
(quotingState v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 320,495 P.2d 1259,1260 (1972)); see 
also State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d 1229,1232-33 (Utah 1996). 
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Id.; see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 (2008) ("A peace officer may make an arrest under 
authority of a warrant or may, without warrant, arrest a person: (1) (a) for any public 
offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace officer;... (2) when the 
peace officer has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A misdemeanor has been 
committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed it 
Objectively, at this point, with every fact marshaled in favor of the State, the 
officer had the following facts at his disposal when he effectuated the arrest: 
• The officer had a description that a 5'7" to 5'9" male black adult wearing a blue 
jacket, grey pants and dark shoes, along with a white male, over G tall, wearing a 
yellow hoodie with a jacket over that and pants were involved in the attack. R. 
211:18. 
• Surveillance footage showed two males, one white and one black, call for a taxi 
from the Motel 6. R. 211:17-18. 
• Mr. Magack, after viewing a still image from the photo, confirmed that the men in 
the photo were the two men who attacked him. R. 211:18. 
• The Motel 6 clerk confirmed that these two were the persons who called the taxi. 
R. 211:18-19. 
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• The officer circulated still photos to the media, which were run by KSL. R. 
211:20. 
• An anonymous female tipster told the officer that the attacker might be at the 
VOA Shelter for Youth, and she named a name. R. 211:22. 
• When the officer went to the VOA, he saw a black male "which immediately 
looked like the individual in the photograph." R. 211:23. 
• This black male, the defendant, "immediately averted his eyes" and looked away 
from the officer. R. 211:24. Then defendant approached the officer, asked why he 
was there, if he was helping with donations and what he was up to. R. 211:24. 
• The detective asked another officer to watch Mr. Penick, then went to talk with 
management. R. 211:25. 
• The officer talked with the director, returned, then arrested Mr. Penick. R. 
211:26. 
At this point, cumulatively, with every inference toward the State, the officer 
could make the following conclusion: Jeremy Penick looked like the suspect and averted 
his eyes when the officer came in. Yet this is not enough of a basis to make an arrest. 
Probable cause requires much more. A reasonable and prudent person could not 
justifiably conclude, based on these facts alone, that Mr. Penick had committed the 
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offense in question. Yet in this case, the officer's arrest seems to be based on nothing 
other than a hunch—that Jeremy Penick was his suspect. 
An arrest may not be based "on a hunch" or on "mere suspicion" that the person 
has committed a crime. State v. Hechtle, 2004 U T App 96, f 16, 89 P.3d 185. Rather, 
"the officer must be able to point to specific facts which, considered with rational 
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the [seizure]." State v. Warren, 2003 U T 
36, f 14,78 P.3d 590; see id. ("In determining reasonableness, 'due weight must be given, 
not to [an officer's] inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or "hunch," but to specific 
reasonable inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his 
experience.' " (citation omitted) (alterations in original)). In other words, " '[p]robable 
cause exists where the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge and of 
which they had reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to 
warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being 
committed.' " Worwood, 2007 U T 47 at J 34 (citation omitted); see Trane, 2002 U T 97 
at J 27. 
The officer did not have any particularized or objective facts at his disposal that 
rose to the level of probable cause that Mr. Penick committed the crime. "Probable cause 
is an objective standard. Officers' subjective beliefs, no matter how sincere, about 
whether they have probable cause, standing alone, neither constitute probable cause nor 
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foreclose a finding of probable cause.' ' State v. Spurgeon, 904 P.2d 220, 226 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995). 
Nothing in the record objectively justifies the conclusion that Mr. Penick was the 
assailant. Nothing in the record links Mr. Penick to the assault at the point of arrest. The 
officer knew the men in the video were the attackers. He had a tip that they were at the 
VOA. He suspected Mr. Penick was an assailant, but he took no steps to objectively 
confirm this fact. In other words, the officer's arrest was based on nothing other than 
unparticularized suspicion that Mr. Penick committed the crime. 
Mr. Penick's avoidance of eye contact does not give rise to even reasonable 
suspicion, much less probable cause. "It is well settled that nervous behavior when 
confronted by a police officer does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity." State v. Lovegren, 829 P.2d 155,158 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. 
Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). "[A]voidance of eye contact, 
which is 'consistent with innocent as well as criminal behavior,' cannot support a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal behavior." State v. Duhaime, 2011 U T App 209, f 18, 
258 P.3d 649,657 (quoting State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431,436 (Utah Ct. App.1990)). 
In fact, it would not take much more investigation to arrive at probable cause to 
arrest Mr. Penick. The officer simply could have located a picture of Mr. Penick (or Mr. 
Ramsay) and showed them in a photo lineup to Mr. Magack, who could identify them as 
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the perpetrators. In fact, at no point was a photo lineup done in this case (other than a 
photo showup), which would have been a much more reliable identification than that 
chosen by the police. Instead, the officer chose to arrest Mr. Penick based on his hunch 
that he was involved in criminal activity. This arrest violated the United States and Utah 
Constitutions since it was not supported by probable cause. 
2, The Defendant's Statements and Letter Written to Mr, Magack 
Would Have Been Excluded From Evidence 
"[I]f an arrest violated a defendant's constitutional rights under either the Fourth 
Amendment or the Utah Constitution or was otherwise unlawful, then any evidence 
secured incident to that arrest must typically be excluded from a criminal trial pursuant 
to the exclusionary rule." Trane, 2002 U T 97 at f 23 (citing Whiteley v. Warden, Wyo. 
State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 568-69,91 S.Ct. 1031 (1971); Kerv. California, 374 
U.S. 23,35,83 S.Ct. 1623,10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963); State v. Shoulderblade, 905 P.2d 289, 
292 (Utah 1995); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,786 (Utah 1991)). 
Because the arrest in this case violated Mr. Penick's constitutional rights, he was 
entitled to have evidence obtained as a result excluded from evidence. See Part I.A.I. 
This would include all of his statements, including his admission that he was present, 
and the letter he wrote to Mr. Magack. Defense counsel had an obligation to object to 
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the introduction of this type of evidence, since it constituted virtually the bulk of the 
State's case against the defendant. 
3. Counsel Ineffectively Failed to Move to Suppress 
Defense counsel's failure to file the motion to suppress denied Mr. Penick the 
opportunity to have valuable evidence against him excluded from evidence. State v. 
Holland, 876 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1994) (declaring "defendants are wholly dependent 
on the dedication of their attorneys to protect their interests and to ensure their fair 
treatment under the law"). Because there could be no conceivable benefit to failing to file 
the motion, defense counsel was ineffective. Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 976. A defendant 
challenging his counsel's failure to file a Fourth Amendment motion must overcome the 
presumption that his counsel engaged in reasonable trial strategy. 
Although " 'failure of counsel to make motions or objections which would be 
futile if raised does not constitute ineffective assistance,' " Parsons v. Barnes, 871 
P.2d 516, 525 (Utah 1994) (quoting Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101,1109 
(Utah 1983)), "where a defendant can show that there was no conceivable 
legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the first prong of Strickland 
is satisfied." State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 359 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (finding no 
tactical basis for failure to file motion to suppress damaging statements within 
time required under statute). 
State v. Gallegos, 967 P.2d 973, 976 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). As argued in Part I.A.I of 
this brief, a motion to suppress evidence collected as a result of an illegal arrest would 
have been granted. Defense counsel would have no legitimate tactical reason for 
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choosing to allow the jury to hear evidence of the defendant's statements if there were a 
valid basis to exclude them. 
This Court has held in similar situations that counsel's failure to file motions can 
constitute ineffective assistance. In State v. Seel, defense counsel failed to file a motion to 
sever defendant's prior enhancement. This Court said that "had counsel made a motion 
to sever the charges requiring proof of prior crimes, the motion probably would have 
been granted. Hence, in not making the motion, counsel's performance was deficient." 
State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954,958 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
In Gallegos, defense counsel filed a pretrial motion to suppress, which was denied 
based on the preliminary hearing transcript. Gallegos, 967 P.2d at 976. At trial, the 
officer's testimony made the motion more legitimate, but defense counsel failed to raise 
the issue. This Court held that defense counsel's failure to re-raise the motion to 
suppress constituted ineffective assistance. Id. at 980. "[W]here a defendant can show 
that there was no conceivable legitimate tactical basis for counsel's deficient actions, the 
first prong of Strickland is satisfied." Id. at 976, quoting Snyder, 860 P.2d at 359. 
In State v. Walker, this Court held that defense counsel ineffectively failed to 
move to suppress statements made in his police interview, since the statements were 
given without the benefit of'Miranda warnings. State v. Walker, 2010 U T App 157, 235 
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P.3d 766 cert, denied, 241 P.3d 771 (Utah 2010). This Court determined that it could 
not "conceive of any reasonable tactical justification for failing to file a motion to 
suppress the police interview." Id. at f 37. 
Similarly, in the case at hand, there can be little doubt that Mr. Penick's 
statements were the most prejudicial piece of evidence in the case, since he admitted to 
being present during the crime. Defense counsel had no basis to allow the jury to hear it, 
especially when there were valid reasons to have it excluded from evidence. 
B. Ineffective Assistance - Counsel's Failure Prejudiced the Defendant 
- The Verdict Would Have Been Different Without the Statements 
Defense counsel's failure to challenge the defendant's statements also prejudiced 
the defendant's case. To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a defendant 
must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694,104 S.Ct. at 2068; State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182,187 
(Utah 1990) ("an appellate court should consider the totality of the evidence, taking into 
account such factors as whether the errors affect the entire evidentiary picture or have an 
isolated effect and how strongly the verdict is supported by the record."). "A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
27 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695,104 S.Ct. at 2069; Barnes, 871 P.2d at 522; State v. Frame, 
723 P.2d401,405 (Utah 1986). 
There are several reasons why the result would have been different in this case. 
First, had the statements been suppressed, the State would have been left with Mr. 
Magack's testimony alone, which is fairly weak on its face. Mr. Magack's attackers sat 
behind him. R. 210:36-37. He did not get a clear face shot. R. 210:83. There were clear 
weaknesses to the eyewitness identification, which all could have been pointed out using 
expert testimony.1 See State v. Clop ten, 2009 U T 84, J f 16-17, 223 P.3d 1103 (expert 
testimony "has been shown to be the best method for educating the jury about factors 
that can contribute to mistaken eyewitness identifications."). In fact, in Clopten, the 
Supreme Court held that expert testimony should be routinely admitted in 
identification cases. Id, at J 30. The expert could explain how phenomenon like weapon-
focus, brief exposure to the perpetrator, lack of light, distractions, cross-racial 
identification, witness certainty, and the stress of the crime can produce inaccurate 
identifications. Id. at J 20, 23. Nearly all of these factors were present in Mr. Penick's 
case. 
Mr. Magack's identification was quite contradictory on its face. When he talked 
to the police, he testified that he "was not really awake." R. 210:83. He told police there 
1
 Mr. Penick testified in this case. Had his statements been suppressed, he likely would 
not have had to take the stand to explain his actions that evening. 
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was only one knife, but after he "later concentrated," he thought both men had knives, 
yet he could not describe the knives because "it happened so quickly." R. 210:69-73, 83. 
He told police one of the men was black and the other Hispanic. R. 210:83. It wasn't 
until he was shown single photos of the defendants that he "remembered" that the man 
was wearing grey and that he was not Hispanic. R. 210:84 ("when they told me who was 
the other person, I told them that I wasn't sure, I thought he was Hispanic but when he 
showed me the picture I saw the picture of a white person."). See Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 
784 (the "blatant suggestiveness of the showup is troublesome"), holding modified by 
State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993). He was unable to identify parts of his 
attackers' clothing. He was not sure if one of the men wore gloves because "everything 
happened so quickly." R. 210:86. Mr. Magack described Mr. Ramsay, who in the video 
footage was a six-foot tall male wearing a yellow hoodie with a jacket over it, as a 
Hispanic male wearing a grey sweatshirt. R. 211:14. The men were in a "fog," so he 
"couldn't see well who they were." R. 210:83. 
Yet, despite these massive inconsistencies, Mr. Magack conclusively identified the 
defendant as his attacker. R. 210:34. Defense counsel, had Mr. Penick's statements not 
been introduced, could have attacked the validity of Mr. Magack's identification, using 
expert testimony as well as cross-examination. Jeremy admitted to the jury that he was 
present at the scene and that he tried to stop Ramsay from attacking Mr. Magack. R. 
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211:124-32. Had the defendant's statements to the police been excluded from evidence, 
Jeremy likely would not have had to testify, and defense counsel could have attacked the 
validity of the identification. The jury would have been left with a substantially weak 
identification, and without Jeremy's admission, would not have had solid evidence that 
Jeremy was even present in the vehicle. The State, without that evidence, would not have 
been able to prove Jeremy's guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Penick asks this court to find that his counsel ineffectively 
failed to challenge the arrest in this case, and that had he done so, Mr. Penick would have 
received a not-guilty verdict. He asks this Court to suppress the evidence and remand for 
a new trial. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 73 day of January, 2012. 
j?at4t^ rMXi 
SAMUEX P. N E W T O N 
Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Fourth Amendment 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Sixth Amendment 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, 
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been 
committed; which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the assistance of counsel for his defen(s)e. 
Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Article 1, Section 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. 
Article 1, Section 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend in person 
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a 
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, 
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to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to 
have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the 
offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
Article I, Section 14, 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against 
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall issue but 
upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place 
to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized. 
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ADDENDUM B 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-2 
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77-7-2. Arrest by peace officers. 
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may, without 
warrant, arrest a person: 
(1) (a) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any peace 
officer; and 
(b) as used in this Subsection (1), "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any 
device that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or records the 
observations of any of the physical senses; 
(2) when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A 
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe that the person 
arrested has committed it; 
(3) when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a 
public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may: 
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest; 
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or 
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another person; 
(4) when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed 
the offense of failure to disclose identity under Section v ; ; ; or 
(5) when the peace officer has reasonable cause to believe that the person is an alien: 
(a) subject to a civil removal order issued by an immigration judge; 
(b) regarding whom a civil detainer warrant has been issued by the federal 
Department of Homeland Security; or 
(c) who has been charged or convicted in another state with one or more aggravated 
felonies as defined by 8 U.S.C. Sec 1101(a)(43). 
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ADDENDUM C 
Transcript of Police Officer's Testimony Surround the Arrest 
R. 211:16-26 
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Q In what capacity? 
A I'nv 41 detective* 
Q And how long have you been a detective for Salt 
Lake City? J | |! 
A For the last three years, 
Q Mr, Goats, you've been here;.I'm going to call you 
Mr., I don't know if that's right* Detective, you've been 
here for the lalst, since yesterday. You know what this case 
is about. 
A il do,; 
Q How did you come to be involved with this case? 
A I; was assigned this case as the followup 
investigator*I 
Q Okay, and how did this case come to your attention? 
A It was assigned to my que, as a normal procedure 
for investigation, to follow up on any information should 
there be ability to develop suspects. 
Q And what information, initial information were you 
given? 
A The jinitial information I had in the report was 
descriptions of two male suspects that committed an assault 
against a taxi cab driver. I also was aware that there was a 
video. 
Q Okay.; What video? 
A There was a video from the Motel 6. 
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Q Okay,; and when you got this 
| this was from Motel 6? 
1 
1 A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
want to 
Q 
with th 
A 
I was. 
Were you given an address? 
Yeah, there was an address 
And what was it? 
I don't recall the physical 
video were you told 
for the Motel 6. 
1 • '•'•• \ ] 1 j 
- I think it's like, I 
say it's 17 6 West on 600 South. 
And you get this video and 
is information, sir? 
address, what do you do 
The;video was obtained by the initial officers for 
the night of the investigation and they seized that video 
placing it into; our evidence. So I retrieved the video out 
of evidence to make a copy of it and then I reviewed the 
video. 
Q 
A 
through 
angles 
window 
side. 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
And what did this video show you? 
On the video it showed multiple camera angles 
out the office area of the Motel 6. One of the camera 
shows two males walking into the shot towards a glass 
where iti appears that there's someone on the other 
I see a male black adult and a I male white adult. 
Did that have any significance to you? 
Yeah,: it did. 
Why? j". 
The males matched the description that was provided 
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to the officers that night. 
Q And what were you looking for description wise? 
A I was looking for clothes, I was looking for face, 
things that I could use to help identify suspects. 
Q Specifically in this case what description did you 
have of the suspects? 
A I had a male black adult. Hb's around 51 7" to 5f 
9"; clothing was like a blue jacket, grey pants, dark shoes. 
Again the male white was wearing a yellow hoodie, had a 
jacket on over that and pants. Description was the male 
white in particulate was significant because he was described 
as being over six foot tall. 
Q Okay, and the video that you just testified 
viewing, did it contain people matching that description? 
A It did. 
i 
i 
Q And let me ask you this, how did you come to the 
conclusion that; the two people you saw in the video were 
connected to this crime? 
A Well, the same day that I got the video, the victim 
in this case,iMr. Magack, had come to!the police station to 
i I 
get his car out of our impound and I had a black and white 
i 
photo which I showed him and he confirmed that those were the 
men and that they were dressed in the way that he saw them 
that night. 
Q Okay. You viewed the video; How did you determine 
M 18 
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that the two people in the video were the two that ordered 
the taxi? 
A Based on the statement of the clerk who called the 
taxi cab, that they had requested a tjaxi come at the request 
of the two men that came to the window. 
Q What ;did you do with this video? 
A I made still shots of what I had at the time. The 
! 
intent was to put it out to the medial because I had no names 
or any identifying information at that time. So I was trying 
to garner information from the publicj. So I was preparing to 
do that. 
MR. VO-DUC: Your Honor, may I approach? 
THE; COURT: You may. 
Q (BY MR. VO-DUC) I'm showing you what has been 
labeled for identification as State'sjExhibit 13. Take a 
look at this. Do you recognize it? j 
j 
A I do. 
Q And what does it show? 
A It shows a still shot that I had obtained from the 
video from the Motel 6. It has a male black adult and a male 
white adult. = . 
Q Does this still shot appear j 
i : 
accurate representation of that space I and time in the video? 
A Yes. 
i 
MR. VO-DUC: State offers 13. 
to be a true and 
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you circulated? 
THE COURT: No objection? 
MR.-; HOWARD: No objection. 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 13 received) 
Q (BY MR. VO-DUC) Now officer, you said that you 
circulated - did you circulate still shots? 
A Correct. 
Q And was 13 one of the shotsl 
A Yes. 
Q Tell me how that works. Was the circulation to a 
particular media outlet? 
A It's to all media outlets. What I do is I prepared 
an information bulletin for what in our department is called 
a Public Information Unit. They are the liasons to the 
media, they give them that information, the case number, the 
description of the crime that's occurred for general 
disbursement out to the public. 
Q And who initiated this dissemination? 
A That was me. 
Q So you passed this shot out^ still Exhibit 13, and 
what happened after that? 
A From what I understand, from our Public Information 
Unit, the only media group to run it Was KSL. At the same 
time that I had, after talking to Mr. jMagack and also then 
dropping the video off to the public information, I received 
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a phone call. 
Q Okay,|and did you receive it at your desk? 
A Yes, it was at my desk. 
Q And who was at the other end? 
A It was an unidentified female. 
Q Okay,;and what did she tell you? 
A She explained to me that she knew of two males that 
were talking about attacking a taxi cab driver and then she 
provided a name!and description. 
Q What name did she provide you? 
A The name that she provided me was — 
MR. HOWARD: Your Honor, object to hearsay. He has 
no personal knowledge. I have no objection to him explaining 
why he's following up but the identification or the specifics 
that this person may have provided would be hearsay. 
MR. VO-DUC: Well, Your Honor, not if it's proof. 
It's not hearsay if it's not provided to prove. We're not 
trying to prove that anyone did anything based on this call. 
It's being offered to explain the actions of the officer and 
it will be later on confirmed through the testimony. 
THE CdURT: I'm going to allow him to testify as to 
what he did but I'm going to sustain the objection with 
regard to the hearsay. So I'm going to allow you to proceed 
and describe what the officer did based upon that 
information. 
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Q (BY MR. VO-DUC) Very well. So you received a call 
and this call tells you what, in essence? 
A It gives me information as to a possible 
i 
individuals involved in the only taxi cab assault that I was 
i 
investigating at the time. 
Q Did you get names? 
A There I was a name provided. 
Q And other than the information as to who was 
involved, did you get any other information from this 
anonymous caller? 
A They gave me a place to look. 
Q What was that? 
A It was the VOA Shelter for Youth. 
Q Are you familiar with this place? 
A Honestly prior to this date, no. 
Q Are you familiar with it now? 
A I am. 
Q And what kind of an establishment is VOA? 
A It's similar to the shelter for adults but it's 
geared more towards youths. It's for runaways, individuals 
that are having jproblems at home, people in transit. It 
gives them a place to stay, clothing, food. 
Q Okay. So the anonymous callerm if I'm summarizing 
accurately said [people involved with this taxi stabbing will 
be found at the VOA? 
22 
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A Correct. 
Q What did you do with this information? 
A Because of the nature of the crime, the specificity 
of the information, the squad that I work with which 
consisted of my sargent, Sargent Moreno, Detective Anderson, 
Detective Flores, myself, we went to the VOA to look for the 
individuals described in this photo. 
and tell us what happened when you get to the Okay, 
VOA? 
A Sargent Moreno and I walked inside of the main door 
and the layout of the place, it's fairly open and immediately 
upon entering I Hooked to my left and I saw a male black 
adult which immediately looked like the individual in the 
photograph. 
Q This male black adult that you see at the VOA could 
I 
recognize him if you saw him again? 
A I would. 
Do you see him today? Q 
A 
Q 
A 
I do< 
Can ydu show us where he is and describe him? 
He'd be the defendant and he's wearing a white 
shirt with blue tie. 
THE CQURT: The record should reflect the witness 
has identified tJhe defendant seated at counsel table. 
Q (BY MR!. VO-DUC) Were you in uniform? 
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A Yes, I was. 
Q Does that mean badge? 
A It was a winter day so I have a fleece jacket which 
has a cloth badge on it. 
Q Okay. So you come into VOA and immediately you 
notice the defendant. Tell us what happened after that. 
A Upon T when I walked in, the thing that caught my 
attention is he immediately looked at me — 
Q Who? 
A I'm sorry, the defendant -
Q It sounds a little (inaudible). 
A I totally understand, Jeremy immediately looked at 
me and then immediately averted his eyes. He looked away from 
me. Second to that he then approached me, he came back, 
locked eyes with me and walked up to me asking me why I was 
there, if I was going to help with donations for the VOA and 
what was I investigating. 
Q Before he asked you what you were investigating had 
you talked to hi!m at all? 
A Prior jto that, no. What I told him is I was there 
on my business and, you know, I'd talk to him later. 
Q Did you tell anyone before the defendant approached 
you and asked yqu what you were investigating, did you make 
it clear to anyqne that you were investigating anything? 
A No. 
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Q How lpng have you been with Salt Lake City, total? 
A Seventeen years. 
Q Have you ever been on patrol? 
I 
A Yes. ! 
i 
j 
Q Is the VOA Shelter the kind of place that your 
agency patrols?) 
A It woilild be. 
But that was your first time there? 
Correct. 
! | 
And just to be clear, what date is this that you're 
Q 
A 
Q 
at VOA? 
A 
Q 
A 
This is a Tuesday. 
And how long after the crime? 
The attack occurred on the 19th, was reported over 
the 20th, so approximately two and a half days, three days, 
Q Sorry 
averts his gaze,j 
I to take this out of order. So defendant 
then he approaches you and asks you what 
your investigating. Continue. What did you do? 
A I told him my - my recollection is I told him 
basically, you know, I'm going to talk to the management, 
thanks, and I had - but because he looked immediately like 
the individual iln the photograph, Detective Anderson had come 
in shortly after me. So I asked him to watch Mr. Penick. 
Q Okay, j And what were you going to do in the 
meantime? 
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A I went to the director, I think her name was 
Angie, at the time and 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Let me ask you, when did you next see Mr. Penick? 
! 
i 
It would have been after that. 
After 
you talked to the Director of VOA? 
Correcbt. 
All right. That's what I'd like you to tell us 
about, this interaction. You decided to go back to the 
defendant and talk to him, was this at the shelter? 
A Correct. 
Q Tell us what you discussed. 
A What I did at that time is we took him into 
custody. I explained to him that he was being detained on 
aggravated assault and I wanted to talk to suspicion of an 
him about it. 
Q Did he agree to talk to you? 
A It appeared that he did and we took him back to the 
police station where a formal interview was conducted. 
I 
Did you conduct that interview? Q 
A 
Q 
I did 
Where was it conducted? 
A The interview was back at the police station in 
what we call the Robbery Squad Interview Room. It's a 
recorded video and audio room. 
! 
Q And wds it recorded? 
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